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Representations of Peripheral Space
in Iraqi Kurdistan
Andrea Fischer-Tahir
1 OFFICIAL MEDIA of the leading parties and of the Regional Government of Kurdistan in
Iraq describe the cities of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya1 as sites of economic growth
and prosperity in order to legitimate its authority and to invite foreign capital. This
policy  includes  academic  representations,  forms  of  “othering”,  and  the  use  of  the
international public as a witness to the success.2 A glance at the official organ of the
Patriotic  Union of  Kurdistan (PUK) can be revealing!  On 12 May 2009,  for example,
Kurdistan-î  Nwê presented  the  headline  “World  Bank  Describes  Kurdistan  as
Development Star in Iraqi  Sky.  93% Development in Kurdistan Region”.3 Follows an
article based on information from the Sulaimaniya Statistics Directorate, a panorama
picture  of  Sulaimaniya  showing  new  bridges,  multi-storey  housing  complexes  and
business  buildings,  and  a  diagram  of  Iraq’s  governorates  comparing  the  economic
wealth of Kurdistan to the poverty in other areas – those of “the failed Arabs”, as the
article  suggests.  What  this  article  conceals,  however,  are  figures  available  at  the
Statistics  Directorate  that  indicate  a  sharp  discrepancy  in  Kurdistan  itself  between
people in the city and people in the villages.4 This discrepancy is likewise evident in
data provided by the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) in cooperation
with Iraqi and Kurdish ministries in 2008. Here, Sulaimaniya city is labelled “better
off”,  whereas  certain  districts  in  the  governorate  of  Sulaimaniya  are  considered
“extremely  vulnerable”  in  terms  of  food  security,  which  is  measured  by  rates  of
employment,  education,  income  and  buying  power,  expenditure, household  assets,
access to productive assets, water, and electricity.5
2 One such district is Qaradagh in the south-west of Sulaimaniya city, an area consisting
of 86 villages and a centre also called Qaradagh (Qaradagh-C). Qaradagh was completely
destroyed during the genocidal Anfal campaign of 1988. In the aftermath of the Kurdish
uprising in 1991, many returned to rebuild it, initially on their own and later supported
by  international  organizations.6 In  1992,  Erbil  became  the  capital  of  the  Kurdistan
Region.  In the course of  the Kurdish militia war (1994-1998),  the PUK established a
Representations of Peripheral Space in Iraqi Kurdistan
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
1
second seat of government in Sulaimaniya – as a counter-project to Erbil, which had
been conquered by the  other  leading party:  the  Kurdistan Democratic  Party  (KDP).
After the Iraqi elections of January 2005, PUK and KDP began a process of unification
and centralization in Erbil. Sulaimaniya lost some of its administrative importance, but
remained the political and economic centre of the south and south-east of Kurdistan.
However,  there is  no sign of  a  “development boom” in Qaradagh.  On the contrary,
agricultural production in the district is fading fast so that local marketing from the
villages  to  Sulaimaniya  through  Qaradagh-C  no  longer  exists.  Most  families  in
Qaradagh-C depend on state incomes and public food distribution, while other options
are, compared to the city, very few and far between. At the same time, it seems to be
unclear  what  kind  of  residence  place  Qaradagh-C  actually  is.  In  contrast  to
international  organizations,  technocrats  of  the  governorate  administration  tend  to
label the place “urban”,7 and the political decision-makers undertake steps to revalue
Qaradagh-C;  they  opened  a  university  and  started  to  build  housing  complexes.  My
observations in the years between 1993 and 2009 indicate that local  people too see
Qaradagh-C  as  a  former  town  repeatedly  destroyed  and  neglected.  People  tend,
however, critically to notice their dependency on Sulaimaniya with regard to income,
food supply, and political decision-making.
3 What  is  the  concept  of  “development”  propagated by  the  Kurdish rulers?  How are
concepts of “urban” and “rural” related to “development”? What explains Qaradagh-
C’s  dependency  on  Sulaimaniya?  How  do  people  in  Qaradagh-C  deal  with  their
dependency on the centre? Starting from these questions, I take a closer look at centre-
periphery relations in Kurdistan. I argue that a combination of circumstances resulted
in  the  unilateral  economic  and  political  dependency  of  Qaradagh  on  Sulaimaniya,
positioning the former on the periphery of the latter. I describe the consequences of
this  dependency,  both  on a  collective  and  an  individual  level,  the  latter  to  be
exemplified with the aid of biographical representation. Subsequently, I turn the focus
to technocratic, academic, and political representations of Qaradagh-C in discourses of
governance, writing history, and nation building, arguing that these representations at
first sight appear to integrate the area into the “development sky” but in reality do
little to reduce dependency. On the contrary, they contribute to peripherization.
4 By  using  the  term  “peripherization”,  I  refer  to  a  recent  debate  in  German  social
sciences on infrastructural disparities, shrinking cities, and out-migration in eastern
Germany. Here, “peripherization” refers to the growing economic, infrastructural, and
political disconnection of small- and medium-sized towns in terms of development and
is discussed as a form of social injustice [Keim 2006; Barlösius and Neu eds. 2008; Beetz
et  al.  2008].  This  approach  echoes  debates  on  core/periphery,  world  system,  and
dependency in the 1970s and 1980s [Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1980; Mj#toset and Clausen
eds.  2007].  In  current  Middle  Eastern  studies,  “periphery”,  “peripheral”,  and
“peripherization” in the context of the global world are terms only casually met. Yet,
there are numerous authors turning the focus to centre-periphery relations inside the
states of the Middle East. Recently, Lisa Wedeen [2008] described public spheres and
political performances in Yemen as a “weak state”, incapable of distributing goods and
preventing violence, while Conrad Schetter and Rainer Glassner discussed as regards
Afghanistan what happens when “the periphery has gained the ability to impose its
interests  to  the  centre”  [2009:  118].  In  the  research  on  Kurdistan  in  Iraq,  centre-
periphery  relations  are  merely  explored  as  “Kurdistan  versus  the  Iraqi  state”
[Stansfield 2003; Ahmed and Gunter 2005; O’Leary and McGarry eds. 2005; Stansfield
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and Ahmadzadeh 2007; Natalie 2010]. By contrast, I want to draw attention to those
forms of power and dependency that obtain within the Kurdistan Region itself.
 
Urban, Rural, and Development
5 Very little research has been done on “rural” or “urban” space in Iraqi Kurdistan. One
of the few works dealing with the “rural” sphere is Arian Mahzouni’s “Participatory
Local Governance for Sustainable Community-Driven Development” in Iraqi Kurdistan
[2008]. Trained in political economy, he analyses “the role of existing local institutions
as part of social capital in the community development process in the rural area” and
states  “the  need  to  introduce  ’participatory  local  governance’  where  political  and
institutional reforms are carried out to increase the capacity and authority of the local
institutions” [ibid.: 11]. A separate approach is pursued by Ehmed Mihemmed Salih, a
“teacher  for  issues  of  the  geography  of  village  residence  and  planning”  at  the
University  of  Sulaimaniya,  as  stated  in  Kurdish  on  his  book  cover  [2008].  Salih  is
concerned with the district of Sharbajêr east of Sulaimaniya. Believing one of the key
reasons for “failed development” outside the cities to be “the village inhabitants’ lack
of professional knowledge”, the geographer calls on the Kurdish government to design
“a new programme for  the development of  the villages”  [ibid.: 5].  The world views
behind these approaches and the proposed strategies obviously differ greatly. Whereas
Mahzouni considers people in the rural areas as to be the main players of “community
development”,  Salih  shows  little  confidence  in  their  capabilities  and  prefers
“development” from above. What is also interesting is Mahzouni’s certainty in applying
in his PhD thesis, published in English, the term “rural” not only to villages but also to
small-sized towns and district centres; Qaradagh-C, for example, appears as “rural sub-
district centre” and other places are designated as “rural small towns” [Mahzouni 2008:
69-78].  But Salih’s job description as “geographer of the village residence” indicates
that the concepts of “urban” and “rural” are not so clear in Kurdish.
6 Although standard population data collection and academic research frequently prefer
to categorize places as either “urban” or “rural”, social changes “have involved the
blurring of the urban-rural distinction” [Champion and Graeme eds. 2004: 3]. There is a
tradition of inventing new concepts to reflect these changes [Cloke 1977; Cromartie and
Swanson 1996] and a debate that goes beyond the “rural-urban continuum” and other
concepts closely linked to affirmative theories of modernization [Halfacree 1993: 25].
The shift in rural studies inspired by the cultural turn favours immaterial approaches
and puts forward the idea that “the rural” should be taken “not as a clearly identifiable
space,  or  as  a  verifiable  of  social  or  economic  characteristics,  but  as  a  meaningful
concept,  discursively  constructed,  understood  and  related  to  in  different  ways  by
diverse social groups” [Holloway and Kneafsey eds. 2004: 2]. The same applies to “the
urban”.
7 In Kurdish-Soranî there are three words to represent imaginations of village: dê, ladê
and gund. “Gund” in the form “gundî” or “gundnişîn” serves to express “someone living
in a village”. The term “ladêyî” means more or less the same but also “village-like”; it is
frequently applied pejoratively by the Sulaimaniya middle class to sanction someone of
lower status for “inappropriate behaviour” or to distinguish oneself from the lower
class.  There  is  no  clearly  corresponding term for  the  English  “rural”  or  “rurality”.
Kurdish  technocrats  educated  in  Arabic  tend  to  use  Arabic  terms.  For  “city”  the
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representation is “şar”, meaning also “civilized land”. There are several compounds
and derivations of it: “şaroçke” for “small city” or “town”, “şarî” for “city-like”, “civil”
and  “city  dweller”,  but  also  for  “urban”  while  “be  şaristanî  kirdin”  is  nowadays
translated  into  English  with  “urbanization”.  The  word  “şarezayî”  represents
imaginations  of  “experience”,  “knowledge”,  “competence”  and  “capability”  and  is
frequently  used in  the  meaning  of  “expert”.  Obviously,  the  social  discourse  relates
certain characteristics to residential places, and not surprisingly are imaginations of
modern civilization rather attached to “city”.  Therefore,  the label  “urban” suggests
having arrived at a certain stage of “development” or “geşepêdan”, which is the Kurdish
term meaning literally: “to make something bloom”. The dominant political discourse
in Kurdistan favours a concept of “development” linked to construction and building
boom,  access  to  modern  technology  and  consumer  goods,  and  the  extension  of
infrastructure  in  the  fields  of  health  and  higher  education.  Shopping  malls  in  the
governorate  centres,  airports  in  Erbil  and  Sulaimaniya,  6  state  and  7  private
universities  have been made symbols  of  the government’s  success.  Only some non-
governmental  organizations  and  grass-root  groups  pursue  a  different  concept  of
“development” and relate the term to social change, and thus to a shift in norms and
values, and in social relations [Koste 2005].
 
Oil Economy, War, and the Forgotten outside the Cities
8 The name Qaradagh refers to three different things: a) a settlement situated about 40
kilometres  south-west  of  Sulaimaniya  city  centre;  b)  the  countryside  framed  by  a
northeastern and southwestern mountain range and c) Qopî Qaradagh, which is part of
the mountain range, the highest peak of which reaches approximately 1,800 metres
above sea level. ’Ebdulla Ghefûr’s Dictionary of Kurdistan Geography specifies that the area
covers 668 km2 [2008: 150]. The city of Sulaimaniya was founded in the neighbouring
Sharizur plain in 1784 as the new capital of the Kurdish Baban Emirate. In the 1920s,
about 41,100 people lived in the city.  The population of  Qaradagh at that time was
10,000 [Edmonds 1957: 439]. In 1991, Sulaimaniya consisted of 27 quarters and had a
population of about 600,000. By 2009, the city had 700,000 inhabitants and the number
of quarters had soared to 136. The population of Qaradagh in 2009 was 12,000, including
the 1,700 inhabitants of Qaradagh-C.8
9 Agriculture in Qaradagh involved producing wheat and barley,  rice along the small
rivers, tobacco, and honey, as well as fruit and vegetables. Since most of Qaradagh was
pasture land, people kept sheep and goats. Qaradagh-C supplied handicrafts (carpentry,
metalwork, tailoring), had a local bazaar and served intermediary trade between this
area and the market in Sulaimaniya. In contrast to the large plains of Kurdistan, the
hilly terrain of Qaradagh showed little evidence of that sharp injustice of a few landlord
families in possession of vast areas of land, on the one hand, and the mass of landless
villagers dependent on them, on the other [Batatu 1978]. Yet, access to land and water
depended on origins; the tribal were more privileged than the non-tribal. As elsewhere
in Iraq, landless villagers benefited from reform laws in 1958 and 1970. However, the
city was offering new jobs, improved access to health care, education, electricity, and
consumer goods. In Iraq, migration to the cities was significantly higher in the 1920s
and 1930s due to British land policies and again in the 1970s as a result of the oil boom.
At the end of the 1970s, the “rentier state” Iraq began to subsidize imported food and
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created a state-controlled system of public food distribution to supply the inhabitants
with staples such as flour, rice, and sugar. Thus, crop-growing and the cultivation of
rice became unprofitable [Gabbay 1978; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987].
10 In the 1980s, most parts of Qaradagh were controlled by the Kurdish Peshmerga. The
guerrilla  fighters  established  a  system  of  local  village  councils,  called  “encumen”
(council). These consisted of men of the village community who politically represented
it towards the Peshmerga. In March-April 1988, some of the villages were attacked with
chemical weapons; all of the villages and Qaradagh-C were ultimately destroyed and
the area heavily mined. Many of the survivors were deported to the collective towns.9
People  began to  return after  the  uprising and rebuild  their  old  homes.  During the
economic crisis in the mid-1990s, which was caused by the UN embargo on Iraq and the
internal embargo imposed by Baghdad on Kurdistan, the people in Qaradagh benefited
from the partial revival of agriculture. At the same time, the middle and lower classes
in  Sulaimaniya,  who  had  lost  their  state  salaries,  were  selling  their  carpets  and
jewellery to buy food. This ceased with the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in 1996-1997.
The  programme  improved  conditions  in  the  city,  but  called  the  revitalization  of
agriculture into question.
11 Faced with economic crisis and militia war since the mid-1990s, tens of thousands of
upper-and middle-class  urban men and women migrated to Europe.  However,  most
families in the areas affected by the Anfal campaign lacked the economic, social, and
cultural capital for emigration.10 When Sulaimaniya began to benefit from remittances
some years later, Qaradagh-C was left empty-handed. After the Iraq War of 2003, the
opening of the region to foreign investment capital, the full reintegration of Kurdistan
into  the  Iraqi  oil  economy,  the  construction  boom  and  market  expansion  all
contributed  to  enhancing  the  cities  of  Erbil,  Dohuk,  and  Sulaimaniya.  During  this
period, lack of rain caused 80% of the springs and small rivers in Qaradagh to dry out.
Crop-growing  and  rice  cultivation  were abandoned,  and  animal  breeding  seriously
harmed.11 As  a  result,  Qaradagh-C’s  intermediary  trade  in  local  goods  became
redundant.  At  the  same time,  the  drying-out  of  the  springs  in  Qaradagh-C  –  three
springs  were  used  collectively  in  the  1990s  –  posed  a  threat  to  drinking  water
maintenance and the cultivation of fruit and vegetables in the gardens.  In order to
provide inhabitants with a minimum of water, the municipality contracted a private
company to bring water from a river in the Sharizur plain to Qaradagh-C. In winter
2008,  water  was  distributed  once  every  ten  days,  and  in  September  2009  this  was
increased to once every four days.12 Although Qaradagh-C has partly revitalized some
forms of handicraft and a small bazaar with shops that sell food, clothing, and other
goods, most commodities come from Turkey and Iran via Sulaimaniya. The majority of
the  adult  labour  force  earns  salaries  as  state  employees  of  the  municipality,  the
departments of agriculture and irrigation, health and education, construction, and the
interior. Since incomes are inadequate, people depend on public food distribution. This
is  in  sharp  contrast  to  Sulaimaniya  city.  Here,  the  plurality  of  sectors  and  job
opportunities allows most people to earn enough – often with two or more jobs – to
dispense with public food distribution or selling the goods at the market [Fischer-Tahir
2009: 34-37].
12 The Anfal campaign, the climate and the “inhabitants’ lack of knowledge” – as asserted
by geographer Ehmed Mihemmed Salih [2008] – are not the sole reason for the decline
of agriculture in places like Qaradagh. The ruling parties and the government favour
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the cities;  officials  in  Kurdistan justify  this  with the statistical  argument that  most
Kurds  live  in  the  governorate  centres.  The  absence  of  agricultural  planning  and
community development by the Kurdish authorities,  the scant  access  to  electricity,
health care, higher education, communication networks, consumer goods, and to the
new leisure parks make life in the villages and small-sized towns unattractive. Thus,
young men tend to seek well-paid jobs with the police or security organizations in the
cities and border areas. This also holds true for Qaradagh-C, although, in contrast to
the villages, it boasts education and health services as well as the presence of political,
cultural, and religious organizations. There are three mosques, some political parties
run small offices there, and a house built in 1992-1993 by a German relief organization
became a temporary PUK women’s centre and a youth centre. The PUK Women’s Union
has run a library for several years. Due to lack of funds, however, the Union’s secretary
in  Sulaimaniya  recently  decided  to  hand  it  over  to  the  Ministry  of  Culture.  The
Women’s Union has now built a vast headquarters in Sulaimaniya, including event halls
and a  sauna for  women.  Qaradagh-C has  a  kindergarden and a  school  for  primary,
intermediate,  and  secondary  classes.  To  take  exams,  however,  pupils  of  secondary
classes are obliged to travel to the city. Qaradagh-C has a small but ill-equipped health
centre and, with no gynaecologist in the area, women are forced to attend a hospital in
Sulaimaniya,  particularly  for  first  births.  Otherwise,  they  depend  on  midwives.
Physicians and most teachers working in Qaradagh-C are usually young graduates from
Sulaimaniya who are required to work for two years outside the city. Hence, the staff
rotates  every two years and they frequently abandon Qaradagh-C in the afternoon,
after work.
13 In  2006,  the  sub-district  of  Qaradagh  was  made  a  district.  Political  representation,
however, was not granted to the local people. When a mayor was to be appointed in
2007,  the  PUK  appointed  a  middle-rank  female  activist  from  its  organization  in
Sulaimaniya,  who was a  close friend of  the leading PUK official  of  the city branch.
Significantly, the village council system that played a representative role before and, in
particular,  during  the  first  years  after  the  uprising  lost  influence  in  recent  years,
whereas city-based government authorities and party organizations have expanded.
 
Biographical Representations of Peripheral Space
14 How is an individual life affected by centre-periphery relations, which subject one’s
place of residence to multiple forms of dependency, and how do individuals shape these
relations? I  will  now discuss  the situation of  a  young woman living in Qaradagh-C,
whom I  will  call  Hêvî.  Having met  her  for  the first  time in  1993,  I  did  a  life-story
interview with her in September 2009.13 Hêvî was born in 1973 as the first daughter of a
Qaradagh-based  family  of  religious  sheikhs  of  the  Merdoxî  lineage.  She  has  two
brothers and a sister. Her mother is a housewife. During the interview, Hêvî stressed
the cultural role of her forefathers in the 19th century when Qaradagh-C consisted of
10,000 houses, listing sheikhs who had permission to teach and claiming that one of the
first judges in Sulaimaniya was her grandfather.
15 This elevated social  status through origin had no bearing on her family’s  economic
situation. Hêvî’s  father worked as a civil  servant for the agriculture department.  In
1988, the family managed to escape to Sulaimaniya, where Hêvî finished school and
completed her professional education. After 1991, the family returned to Qaradagh and
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built  a  new  house  on  the  site  of  their  old  home.  Hêvî  emphasized  that  it  did  not
correspond to the one that was destroyed, which was made of bricks, cement, iron and
glass, but was smaller and had one storey only. The walls were plastered with loam and
the roof was made of wood and a mixture of loam and straw. In short, it was “just like
the houses in the villages”. In 1993, Hêvî began to teach the children of the returnees,
along  with  Rengîn,  a  woman  of  similar  age  and  education.  Around  this  time,  she
became a member of the PUK Women’s Union. Concurrently, the German NGO Medico
International took up its work in the area and opened an office in Qaradagh-C:
We saw that all of the employees were men, the workers, the guards and so on. As
we visited the Women’s Union, we said: “Why are there no women?” Then they
gave Rengîn and me a job. When their programme ended, our work ended too.
16 In 1995,  Hêvî  worked in Sulaimaniya in the department that  organized public  food
distributions:
Three or four times a week, I went to Sulaimaniya in the morning and returned in
the  afternoon.  It  was  exhausting  and  the  wages  did  not  even  cover  the  daily
transport.  Back and forth, but I  just sat there with nothing to do. Not only me.
Nobody had anything to do because at that time there was nothing to distribute.
17 In 1996, Hêvî got a posting back to Qaradagh and worked in the office of the sub-district
administration. The sub-district director, however, resided and worked in the city. She
continued to be active in the Women’s Union and was involved in awareness campaigns
on forced marriage, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. She remarked as
regards the latter:
The circumcision of girls does not exist in Qaradagh-Centre. In the villages, I don’t
know. Maybe they do it secretly. But we stood up at meetings with them and said
this should not happen.
18 Hêvî  managed  to  transform  her  political  commitment  into  a  job  when  she  began
working in the Women’s Union library. In 1999, she married a man of similar age and
education  from  Qaradagh-C  who  worked  for  the  security  police  and  who  wasn’t  a
relative, she said. Her husband later became head of the security police in Qaradagh-C.
In 2009, Hêvî gave birth to male twins in a hospital in Sulaimaniya.
19 In the first  years of  married life,  the couple lived in a house rented from someone
residing in Sulaimaniya. Then, the young family succeeded in obtaining one of the ten
houses  Medico  International  had  built  for  its  personnel  and  handed  over  to  the
government  when  it  left  the  area.  As  dual  earners,  the  couple  achieved  a  certain
prosperity, visible, for example, in the large, well-equipped kitchen with a hot and cold
water dispenser. However, they rent it from the municipality. Most other people in
Qaradagh-C live in their own houses, but:
– People in Qaradagh-Centre have no property certificates. Because the government
says they have to survey Qaradagh-Centre and make a new cadastral map. Then
people can get deeds for housing.
– When did the government say this?
– Years ago! And then, three years ago, Mr. X.14 came and promised that people
would get deeds. But nothing has happened up to now.
20 In September 2009, Hêvî took advantage of maternity leave. It was unclear at the time
whether she would continue working in the library. What was clear, however, was the
ending of  her commitment to the Women’s Union.  Like many other people in both
Qaradagh and Sulaimaniya,  she made no secret  of  voting for  the new Sulaimaniya-
based  oppositional  platform  Change  in  the  July  2009  elections.15 In  response,  the
Representations of Peripheral Space in Iraqi Kurdistan
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
7
security police in Sulaimaniya transferred her PUK-loyal husband; he was first sent to a
distant checkpoint and later to another.  Punishing the brother or husband of a so-
called  disloyal  woman  and  bringing  political  strife  into  people’s  living  rooms  and
bedrooms is a new method adopted by the PUK to discourage others from joining the
opposition.  Either  way,  the  case  demonstrates  yet  again  the  dependency  of  the
inhabitants of Qaradagh-C on the course of events in Sulaimaniya.
21 Many of Hêvî’s contemporaries, including her friend Rengîn, moved to Sulaimaniya in
the last few years. Did she never feel the desire to live in the city?
Yes [she said]. After the uprising there was no electricity, no water, and then there
were  the  mosquitoes.  My  brother,  my  sister,  and  I  wanted  to  go  back  to
Sulaimaniya, but my father worked here. So we couldn’t live in Sulaimaniya.
22 But then she said:
Later, I got used to life in Qaradagh. Now, I like it. I don’t believe there is any other
place that is so calm and quiet.
23 At first, it was taken for granted that an unmarried daughter must remain under her
father’s  control.  Later,  Hêvî  and her  husband’s  respective  jobs  were the reason for
staying. Political activity may have added more meaning to Hêvî’s life. Interestingly,
she describes Qaradagh-C as “calm and quiet”, presenting it as an advantage to live
outside the city, which in turn can be understood as drawing a distinction between
villagers  and  city  dwellers.  Several  other  such  hints  at  distinction  emerged  in  the
course of the interview. Hêvî stressed “the lack of strong social relations”, for instance,
and  compared  the  “warm”  mourning  ceremonies  in  Qaradagh-C  with  those  in
Sulaimaniya, which were “colder”. However, she did highlight the privileged access to
infrastructure as a positive aspect of the city. As already mentioned, she distinguished
between  villagers  and  Qaradagh-C  with  regard  to  housing  and  female  genital
mutilation. She likewise compared the district to other non-city environments when
she claimed that people in Qaradagh “do not make trouble” like “hot-tempered men” in
other areas, or that forced marriage was not prevalent here because “the people of
Qaradagh live near Sulaimaniya and are more aware.” The most striking statement of
distinction between the village and the city emerged when I asked her what the term
“village-like” meant to her, a term, as already mentioned, which is frequently applied
pejoratively by the Sulaimaniya middle class. Hêvî’s response was:
That’s a very ugly word. And where do the people in the city who use it come from?
They all moved from the village to the city. Even today, people from the city are
grateful to have the village. They say our cooking fat is village-like. Our yoghurt
water is village-like and good. If nobody lived in the village where would they get it
from?
24 It  is  “our”  cooking fat  and “our”  yoghurt:  Hêvî  was  never  involved in  agricultural
production but the widespread negative connotation of this particular term drove her
to identify with the villagers of Qaradagh and the non-city environment she lives in.
However, her material living conditions and narrations indicate that she neither lives
in a “rural” nor in an “urban” space. Rather, her experience can be described as of
“rural-urban hybridity”.
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Technocratic, Academic, and Political Representations
of the Periphery
Development
25 According  to  a  new  map  from  the  Sulaimaniya  Statistics  Directorate,  Qaradagh-C
consists of four quarters: Sharewanî, Hacî, Serhewz, and Number 301. However, people
in Qaradagh-C tend to speak of  “up” and “down the street”,  of  the “bazaar”,  or to
specify a place by referring to a mosque, a school, a (former) spring, a person, or a
house. Sharewanî means “municipality” and got its name from the fact that the seat of
the mayor is located there. The word derives from “şar”: “city”. During the 1990s, the
original  Arabic term “beledîye” was used for “municipality”,  which is  also linked to
imaginations of city, but not in the exclusive sense of the Kurdish “şar”. As already
indicated, in academic and technocratic discourse, there are contesting representations
of  Qaradagh-C:  it  is  labelled  “urban”  by  the  Statistics  Office  and  a  “town”  by  the
geographer ’Ebdulla Ghefûr [2008: 150], whereas World Food Programme16 and Arian
Mahzouni  [2008:  78]  opt  for  “rural”.  This  ambiguity  is  a  common  phenomenon  in
Qaradagh-C, as it is in Kurdistan and elsewhere. In our particular case of inner Kurdish
centre-periphery relations and their links to “development”, it is conspicuous that both
Kurdish planners and the administration prefer “urban” and “town” as designations for
Qaradagh-C, and invented a name for the quarter that symbolizes the “city”, referring
to urbanity as a marker of “development”. Is their aim to bring Qaradagh-C closer to
the  “development  sky”?  At  the  same  time,  the  government  holds  Qaradagh-C  at  a
distance: the residence of the new mayor is not in Qaradagh-C, but in Sulaimaniya. As
the  mayor  says,  this  is  because  she  is  a  widow  and  her  youngest  daughter  still  a
student. Either way, the mayor prefers to visit Qaradagh three to four days a week “to
serve the people”.17 Absentee mayors were quite typical under the Ottoman and the
Baban rulers.
26 Willingness to pursue development is represented by the new, three-storey building
complex for local  employees of  the Health Department.  Other construction projects
began in 2008; according to the mayor, however:
It has not yet been decided to whom the regional government will give the new
houses.18
27 Along with other actors, the mayor recently founded a league for the development of
Qaradagh, but Hêvî’s husband, who has joined the group, claimed that its activities are
restricted to internal meetings. The most remarkable representation of “development”
is the Qaradagh University for Development, which boasts faculties in law, information
technology,  political  science,  and  translation.  It  is  situated  on  one  of  the  hills  of
Qaradagh-C and was inaugurated by the Iraqi president and the leader of the PUK, Jalal
Talabani, in December 2008. Will it push modernization forward in Qaradagh-C? The
University of Koye, inaugurated by Talabani in 2004, contributed to the construction
boom and the growth in population in Koye, an old city quite far from Sulaimaniya and
Erbil. In the case of Qaradagh-C, lecturers and students will most likely commute to
work in Qaradagh-C from Sulaimaniya.
28 Since employees from Sulaimaniya regularly commute to Qaradagh-C and people like
Hêvî have always been connected to the city through employment, it could be argued
that Qaradagh-C is essentially part of the Sulaimaniya city agglomeration rather than a
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peripheral  space.  In  fact,  Sulaimaniya’s  territorial  expansion has  already led to  the
agglomeration  of  numerous  surrounding  villages.  Qaradagh,  in  contrast,  lacks  the
water and flat  land required for construction, and,  up to now, the shortest  way to
Qaradagh-C is across the mountains.
 
Great History
29 In Iraqi-Kurdish historiography, Qaradagh is mentioned as a geographical place, and
there are  individual  agents  from  Qaradagh  who  live  in  Sulaimaniya,  i.e.,  religious
sheikhs,  judges,  teachers and artists  [Zakkî 1951;  Salihî  Reşe and Resûl  1987;  Baban
1993; Mamosta Ce’fer 2006].
30 I recently found a short history of Qaradagh on the Kurdish website www.merdox.net.
The narration stresses the ancient history of the area and centres on two points, the
first of which is a rock relief identified elsewhere as a “prototype of the celebrated
’Stele of Victory’ erected by Naram-Sin of Akkad” [Edmonds 1957: 360]. Naram-Sin was
an Akkadian king who lived 2190-2154 BC. The author, ’Ela Nûrî Baba ’Elî,  refers to
Edmonds but presents the rock relief as “massive evidence for the fact that the Qopî
Qaradagh was a centre of the struggle of the Kurdish nation some thousand years ago”.
The second point is the name Qaradagh. Referring to Kurdish historians, the author
argues that it is reminiscent of a Turkish term meaning “Black Mountain” but has its
origin in “kardax” or “kardox” clearly echoing “kardukh”, i.e., the name Xenophon gave
the ancient people of the Zagros Mountains, who are believed to be the ancestors of
today’s Kurds.19
31 These two narrations are established in Kurdish historiography. Local people such as
those of Qaradagh are often familiar with single fragments of these narratives. It also
explains why Hêvî – when I met her in 1994 – was keen for me to visit “Naram-Sin”.
From a nationalist point of view, however, it makes sense to repeat those narratives,
and to expand and strengthen the argument, and transform it into popular knowledge
of  broader  significance.  The  www.merdox.net  website  is  run  by  actors  outside
Qaradagh whose parents or ancestors emigrated and are commonly called Qaradaghî. It
also publishes texts written by people living in Qaradagh-C. Although not the focus of
the website, most texts in the frame “History” refer to Qaradagh. The name “Merdox”
is a reference to Hêvî’s forefathers. The website advertises Kurdish TV stations, not
least  those  of  the  PUK.  In  line  with  the  idea  of  Qaradagh-C  as  an  ideal  university
location,  Burhan Sheikh Mecîd,  a  retired teacher  living  in  Qaradagh-C,  published a
short text on “How Qaradagh became a place of knowledge”: in the late 18th century
when “Qaradagh-C had 6,000 houses”, “the Baban emir founded a university (danişga)”.
The site remained a place of knowledge until 1965, when “Qaradagh was again burnt
down”.20 Clearly, the aim of such texts is not merely to revalue the countryside but to
use  Qaradagh  as  a  symbol  in  nationalist  discourse  to  legitimize  political  acts  and
nationalist domination.
 
Peaceful Farmers and Salary Consumers
32 The Kurdistan-î Nwê newspaper produced a full page on Qaradagh on 11 October 2009.
Since Sulaimaniya’s peripheral space is generally marginalized in PUK journalism, this
was unexpected. The page consisted of an interview with the mayor, her photograph, a
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biographical column and a panorama shot of Qaradagh-C. The interview headline read:
“Road and Water Projects to Be Implemented in Qaradagh for 11 Billion Dinars”, that is,
converted, 7 million euros. Journalist Rizgar Qaradaghî writes in his introduction:
From an administrative perspective, Qaradagh consists of the centre of the district,
the sub-district Sêwsênan, and 86 villages. The number of inhabitants is stated to be
12,000.  The business  of  this  region [my  emphasis]  was  agriculture  and  animal
breeding, but the dry year[s] is the reason that led to abandoning agriculture. What
is left for the farmers who stayed is animal breeding. Some of the others receive
salaries from the civil services (muçexor-e le fermangekan-da). In general, the Qaradaghîs
are well-educated, poor, and far from violence and conflict, or making trouble.
33 Village means agriculture. Some of the others receive salaries from the civil services,
literally “salary-eaters in the state agencies”. There is nothing in Kurdish to prevent
people from saying “some are civil servants” rather than the pejorative term “muçexor
”. The people of Qaradagh are otherwise represented as peaceful and well-educated
farmers,  an  outlook  reminiscent  of  Hêvî’s  reflections.  The  text  makes  no  further
reference to the lives of people in Qaradagh, leaving the impression of a faceless mass.
Furthermore, no distinction is made between the people of the villages and those of
Qaradagh-C.
34 The repetition of the introductory text at the end of the interview makes it difficult to
detect whether the mayor or the journalist is speaking. The text is both a journalistic
and  a  political  representation,  or,  more  precisely,  the  representation  of
representations,  since  “represented  conversations  [...]  are  nothing  but  tidied-up
versions  of  real  talk”  [Caldas-Coulthard  1995:  229].  Since  the  newspaper  primarily
serves PUK interests, the topic is not Qaradagh. Rather is the topic the distinguished
politics  of  the Kurdish government –  as  represented by the words  of  the mayor,  a
woman “originally from Qaradagh”, whose husband was “a person of Kurdish-national
and revolutionary beliefs [...] and became a martyr in 1991”. In response to the question
of whether she as a woman was prone to “emotionalism”, the narration lets the mayor
promise to do her job “according to the law, which does not go with emotionalism”.
The  text  presents  the  mayor  as  a  politically  loyal  woman  who  solves  everyday
problems, particularly those of local women, who “express their demands by letter or
peaceful  demonstration”.  Finally,  the  narration  permits  the  mayor  to  call  on  the
provincial council of Sulaimaniya for more commitment, so that the budget allocated to
Qaradagh “will definitely be spent on the people of this place”. It is evident from the
text  that  the  mayor  does  not  make  major  decisions.  The  provincial  council,  the
governor, the Kurdish government and the party are all above her. Be it millions or
billions, the headline makes a promise, but the text does not reveal a plan. And the
representation of the Qaradaghis does not contribute to a more sophisticated image of
the  inhabitants,  rather  to  the  making  of  the  “rural  other”  and  to  increasing
peripherization. However, what impact such a text may have ultimately depends on
how it is read; on whether the reader perceives the text in a way of – to adopt Stuart
Hall’s terms [1980] – dominant-hegemonic, negotiated, or oppositional reading.
 
Conclusion
35 Qaradagh-C seems to be both too far and too near the city of Sulaimaniya, of which it
has become a peripheral space due to economic and political circumstances. Hêvî’s self-
representations give an impression of what unilateral dependency means in everyday
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life from a biographical perspective. They also indicate the options and agendas people
pursue  in  their  endeavour  to  work  around  or  resist  dependency.  The  academic,
technocratic, and political representations described in my paper express, and at the
same time shape, the process of peripherization. Calling something “development” and
rendering it  “urban” with signifying acts will  not halt this process if  economic and
political dependency persists. On the contrary, dependence is reinforced here by the
dominance of  city-based agents,  performances of  centre superiority,  and constructs
portraying the faceless “rural other”. Neither does peripherization cease with cultural
revaluation  of  the  countryside  as  an  element  of  nationalist  discourse.  From  my
perspective,  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  “sustainable  community-driven
development” as suggested by Arian Mahzouni [2008]. There is, however, no sign of this
so far.
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NOTES
1. For Kurdish  and  Arabic  geographical  and  personal  names,  I  use  a  simplified
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Universität  zu  Berlin,  Zentrum  Moderner  Orient),  and  was  funded  by  the  German
Research  Foundation.  Special  thanks  to  Mehmûd  ’Osman  Me’rûf,  director  of  the
Sulaimaniya  Statistics  Directorate,  and  Behar  Hesen  Mihemmed,  employee  at  the
Directorate, for their kind cooperation. I am very grateful to Shîrîn Mehmûd Salih, the
Mayor of Qaradagh, who has supported my field research. 
3. All quotations from Kurdish and Arabic are my own translations.
4. Sulaimaniya Statistics  Directorate (SSD),  “Poxteyek le  diyarîkirdin-î  hêl-î  nebûn-î
xorakî-u naxorakî” (“Extract of Identifying the Poverty Level”). Ministry of Planning
(not published), 2009, p. 4. 
5. UNWFP,  “Comprehensive  Food  Security  and  Vulnerability  Analysis  in  Iraq”,
2008, pp. 203-217. 
6. On Anfal, see Middle East Watch, “Genocide in Iraq. The Anfal Campaign against the
Kurds”, New York, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1993. See also HRW, “Bureaucracy and
Repression”, New York, 1994. On the uprising and Kurdish elections in 1991-1992, see D.
Keen [1993] and H. Cook [1995]. 
7. SSD, “Pêşbîni geşeyî danîştuwanî-î parêzga-î Slêmanî bo sal-î 2009” (“Prognosis of
Population Growth of 2009”). Ministry of Planning (not published), 2009, p. 1. 
2. This article was written as part of the Joint Research Project SFB 640 (Humboldt
Universität  zu  Berlin,  Zentrum  Moderner  Orient),  and  was  funded  by  the  German
Research  Foundation.  Special  thanks  to  Mehmûd  ’Osman  Me’rûf,  director  of  the
Sulaimaniya  Statistics  Directorate,  and  Behar  Hesen  Mihemmed,  employee  at  the
Directorate, for their kind cooperation. I am very grateful to Shîrîn Mehmûd Salih, the
Mayor of Qaradagh, who has supported my field research. 
8. Information from the Sulaimaniya Statistics Office, September 2009.
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9. Middle East Watch, “Genocide in Iraq. The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds”. New
York, HRW, 1993, pp. 113-124, 361. 
10. For the use of the term “capital”, I rely on the work of Pierre Bourdieu [1986]. 
11. Interview  with  the  Mayor  of  Qaradagh,  Shîrîn  Mehmûd  Salih,  Qaradagh,  26
September 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. The interview was conducted and evaluated following the approach of “narration
analysis of biographical self-presentation” as outlined by W. Fischer and G. Fischer-
Rosenthal [1997]. On the “biographical turn”, see also P. Chamberlayne et al. eds. [2000].
14. Hêvî mentions a high-ranking PUK and government official. In order to protect her,
I do not state his full name.
15. Change (Goran)  was  established as  an election platform in  2009  by  the  private
media company Wusha Corporation headed by Noshirwan Mustafa Amin, a guerrilla
leader and PUK politician who was born in 1944 in Sulaimaniya. In the election of July
2009, Change gained 25 of the 111 seats.
16. “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq”, 2008, p. 202. 
17. Interview with Shîrîn Mehmûd Salih.
18. Ibid.
19. See http://www.merdox.net/news.php?readmore=16, 23 July 2009,  accessed on 1
September 2009.




Les  villes  de  Erbil,  Dohuk  et  Sulaimaniya  sont  décrites  comme  des  espaces  de  croissance
économique  et  de  développement.  Cet  article  s’intéresse  au  fossé  qui,  au  Kurdistan  irakien,
sépare  les  villes  « prospères »  des  quartiers  « extrêmement  vulnérables ».  L’exemple  de
Qaradagh, un district du gouvernorat de Sulaymaniya, montre que plusieurs facteurs contribuent
à sa dépendance économique et politique vis-à-vis de Sulaymaniya, ce qu’illustrent les entretiens
que nous avons menés sur place. Même si, à première vue, les représentations technnocratiques,
académiques  et  politiques  semblent  inclure  Qaradagh dans  les  projets  de  développement,  en
réalité,  très  peu  est  fait  pour  réduire  sa  dépendance.  Au  contraire,  ces  représentations
accentuent le processus de périphérisation.
The large cities of Erbil,  Dohuk and Sulaimaniya in Iraqi Kurdistan are described as places of
economic  growth and development.  This  article  focuses  on  the  sharp discrepancies  between
“better-off”  cities  and  “extremely  vulnerable”  districts.  The  example  of  Qaradagh,  a  district
center in the governorate of Sulaimaniya, is used to argue that a combination of circumstances
has resulted in the town’s economic and political dependency on Sulaimaniya, the consequences
of  this  being  illustrated  through biographical  accounts.  Technocratic,  academic  and political
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conceptions seem at first sight to incorporate Qaradagh in development projects but, in fact, do
little to reduce this dependency. On the contrary, they shape the process of peripheralization.
INDEX
Mots-clés : urbain/rural, périphérisation, représentations cognitives, district de Qaradagh,
Kurdistan irakien
Keywords : cognitive representations, peripheralization, Qaradagh District Center, Iraqi
Kurdistan, rural/urban
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